

A REVIEW
OF THE
OBSERVATIONS

UPON SOME OF HIS

Majesties late Answers
and *Expreses*.

Written by a Gentleman
of Quality.



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A REVIEW OF THE

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IN the Contestation between Regall and Parliamentary authority, finding by the frequent Declarations of the two Honourable Houses made unto the People, (like so many appeales of the Body representative, to the Body at large,) that the Sovereign judgement of all things is (upon the matter) brought unto the People, I see not, but that it is both lawfull, and even the necessary duty of every private man, that hath any understanding of the things in question, to Publish his particular judgement and apprehension of them; That from the most free and Universall agitation of the Truth, some judgement from that vast body may be rendred to the appellors satisfaction. And so, having conceived that the Author of the Observations upon His Majesties late Answers, hath upon this subject broached divers State-doctrines, neither agreeable to our Lawes, nor yet to true Christian Religion: and that yet, (to the prejudice of the Truth,) they have, as truths, got a strong prepossession of mens minds; I have thought fit to offer such notions upon the summe of them, as I conceive ought to bring them to a more serious re-examination. Saving therefore to His Majesty His Right of Animadversion into the particular *falsities, insolencies, and seditious calumnies* in the severall passages of that Book; I onely apply my selfe to the summe and scope thereof, and that I finde to be to this purpose.

First, That God is no more Author of Regall power then of Aristocratical, and as much Author of usurped Dominion as of Hereditary. That Power is originally inherent to the People, and but derivative

relative in Kings. That the People are the efficient and final cause of Kings. That the name of King is not greater then of People. That though the King be *singulis major*, yet He is *universis minor*. That He is not to be accounted a God, a King, a Lord, a Father, &c. to the People *communiter*, but *divisim* only. That Treason (so far as it concerns the Prince) is not so horred in Nature, as oppression in a Prince, &c.

In the better examining of these, we finde; That God creating Man single, left him not other means of multiplying, then onely by propagation, and in propagating, he gave the Rule and Sovereignty of the issues propagated, to the Father of whom they were propagated; and in defiance of the Father, He gave the Rule of all the younger (and consequently of their descendants too) unto the first borne, (as we may see where God tells *Cain*; *Thy Brother shall be subject to thee, and thou shalt beare rule over him*.) So that all Men in the beginning were born Subjects, either to him that naturally was their Father, or to him that by right of primogeniture was representatively the Father. After the Flood, the then common Father of the World, having a family of three Sons of differing condition, and they (for the Plantation of the then unpeopled World) by Gods determinate fore-councell dispersed into three distant parts of it the elder Brothers right of Sovereignty over those younger (through distance of place, and want of occasion and meanes to exercise it,) became wholly neglected, as upon like severance and search of new places of Plantation, it in other places; often after became. But every Planter becoming so by himselfe a Father, soon became a Family, and from a Family grew into a City, so into divers Cities, and at length into a Kingdome. And though we first heare of the irregular Kingdome of the descendant of *Cham*, yet finde we also, that *Shem* the eldest and blessed Sonne of those three, was grown into the Sovereignty of a Kingdome, and was the first King that ever was in the World: For by the judgement and computation of the Learned, *Melchisedeck* the King of *Salem*, could be no other then very *Shem* himselfe. Neither had the ten Tribes of *Israel*, (when revolting from the sonne of *David*, they said, *we had no part in David, nor Portion in the Sonne of Jesse*,) any other meaning then only to inferre; That *David* being neither their Father by Nature, nor in Primogeniture by Representation, they were

free from that naturall subjection unto his sonne, which otherwise (they implied) they were bound to be subject to. And indeed, (if there had not been an especiall ordinance of God in the case) it had truely followed; that being neither descended of Jesse, nor Jesse the first borne of their common Father; the rule of subjection which followed Nature, had not tyed them to obey his sonne. The fifth Commandement it selfe proveth this naturall bond of subjection, when (as all Churches expound it) it commands *Obedience* to Governours, under the name of Parents onely. And that according to Gods saying unto *Caine*) *Soveraignty* did rightfully follow *Primogeniture*, we may see it in this; that as God promised *Jacob* the *Soveraignty*, so he procured him the *Birth-right*, formerly transacted by *Esau* sale of it. Therefore a King, being no other then a common Father, by either *Naturall* or *Legall* Right; neither the People, nor any other Power then only God (the Father of Nature it selfe) can properly be said to be the Author of the being of Kings.

Next, God hath not authorised Kingly Power in nature only; but by his expresse promises before the Law, and by his ordinances concerning it, in the Law, even before ever the People of *Israel* sought a King: Also by setting over his People the government of a King: by sacrating that office with *Annoyning*; by his own assuming of the name of King; and by setting forth our Saviours Dominion over his Church, by that name and office. In all which if God hath done the like for authorizing *aristocraticall* or *usurped* Dominion; then is the Observer in those assertions to be justified: but if not, then is he in them an Author of lyes. Yea, God is more Author of what he ordaines and directs, then of what he only permits; and therefore more Author of good then of evil. Wherefore to say *usurped* Dominion referres as much to God as author thereof, as lawfull *hereditary* Dominion doth, is not only false, but also blasphemous.

As for Power inherent in the People, how should one imagine such a thing? unlesse also he would imagine People to be *juvenes aqulone creati*, men like *Grashoppers* and *Locusts* bred of the Winde; or like *Cadmus* his men sprung out of the earth; where none deriving from any pre-existent Parents, had all of them equall originall and power, and therefore subject to no civill Power but what by agreement they themselves ordained. But where man is borne of a Father, to whom, by the Law of God and Nature he is subject, he is

so far from having inherent Power originally in him, as that he has not his own originall being, but only in subjection; either to his immediate Father, if his Father were absolute, or to him and his common Father, if his Father were a Subject. Now if man, in his particular and naturall capacity, hath not originall power of himselfe inherent in him, he cannot have originall inherent Power, by any civill capacity whatsoever.

And though, upon the overthrow and breaking up of Kingdoms, instance may perhaps be given; that People have made themselves a King, yet does not that prove the People to be the originall of Kingly Power; no more then going upon crutches, after losse of legs, proves crutches the originall and naturall way of going: for people being by misfortune deprived of their naturall common Father and Sovereign, must of necessity entertaine such supply of the losse, as their fortune can best afford them. And even in that case too, their making of a King, was no other, then the choosing of one to bear the known Office of the true and naturall common Father. For we must note, they never made Kings by giving them power *constitutive*, to doe so, and so; (as they must have done, if Kings had had nothing but commissiionary authority from the people) but they made Kings, only by choosing one to beare the office and person of the same Governour, that the law of nature had before described, and authorized to command and govern.

Though therefore the ten Tribes of *Israel* rebelled against *Rehoboam*, for refusing to releive their greivance, made *Jeroboam* King, and God forbad *Rehoboam* to warre against them for it; yet this proves not, That people have power of making Kingdoms or Kings. For God himselfe had first declared, that he would rend ten Tribes from the Kingdome of *Judah*, and that *Jeroboam* should be King over them. And had *Jeroboam* and the People attended Gods will and pleasure in it, (as *David* after his annointing did) he had been a King, and they a Kingdom not of their own making, but of Gods. But to shew how quickly the by-affectiions of the people pervert the right work of God, when they looke not as well unto the way, as unto the end: we may see, that for all this, new Kingdom and Kings were of Gods appointing, yet when the people would in a way of their owne, take upon them the Crowning of the man appointed by God, God disclaimes the authorizing of what they did. *They set up*
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King (saith God) but not by me; and in recording the fact (both in the first of Kings, and againe in the second of Chronicles) the Scripture directly telleth us, that they rebelled. That therefore God forbade Rehoboam to fight against them, did not approve what the people had done, for God tells the reason why he forbade them; not because the People had done well, but because the thing was of God, which if God had not revealed, Rehoboam might, and ought to have reduced them to their obedience: and howsoever the thing it selfe was of God, yet to teach us, that the people have not authority to do the thing that he hath ordained, without his especiall appointment, we see that when Abijah, (Rehoboams sonne) with foure hundred thousand, against eight hundred thousand, pitched a battle upon the right of that Kingdome, and committed the cause to God, though Jeroboam had entrapped him in an ambush, God gave such a sentence against Jeroboam and his people, that after an overthrow and slaughter of five hundred thousand of them, they were disabled from ever recovering strenght in all Abijahs dayes. And that Subjects for luck sake may take heed of making new Kingdomes, or Kings: this King (the onely instance of peoples King-making, and yet in making of whom the people did only anticipate Gods purposed work) became the instrumentall efficient of their finall destruction, & (setting up the Idolatry which the people themselves had first affected) his sinne through all his successors so adhered to them, as that it never left them, untill it had extirpated them from their own, and transferred them captives into another Country. To conclude this point, when we heare God himselfe stiling himselfe a King, a great King of Kings, and telling us that the Kingdome is the Lords, &c: who without reluctance of conscience, and even horror of it, can yeild the power of Kings to be derivative, and the people to be the originall of it? for then, God by setting himselfe forth in the name of a King, does in stead of presenting himselfe, in a notion of magnificence and Sovereignty, present himselfe under the notion of an inferiour and of a derivative, from a more Sovereigne and originall Power: whereas we see God never expresses his Power by the name of an Elder, or of a Magistrate, or any subordinate Authority, how good or honourable soever. Yea to be King of Kings, is then no more, then to be the derivative and creature of Kings.

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As for the Peoples being the efficient and finall cause of the King. If one knew in what sence the Observour would be understood, he were soone answered. For if he would be understood according to the propriety of his words, (as indeed that which he would maintain does needs he should.) Then is that position not only false, but an impious falsehood, even full blasphemy: for properly God, and none but God, is the efficient and finall cause of all things: there being no difference betwixt the efficient cause and the Creatour. But if the Observer meanes, that the People be the instrumentall cause of Kings; the instrumentall cause and mediave end, are termes of so extreame and notorious difference, and consequence, from efficient and finall cause, as it is by no meanes to be pardoned him that he should mean the one, and say the other. Besides, to understand him to, does overthrow all that he drives at: for if the People be but the instrumentall cause of Kings, then can they not be the end of Kings, no more then the instrument of any work can be the end for which the work was made; but contrarily the work is the end of the instrument, and therefore greater then the instrument. As for the people, they are so farre from being the finall end of Kings, that they are not any way the end of them. For government is the end of Kings (of which the People are but the Subject) and God alone is both the efficient cause and finall end, both of the Government, Governour, and Subject to be governed.

As for that which he affirms, that though Kings be *singulis majoris* yet are they *universis minores*, and that wherein sever the be to be accounted, *Gods, Lords, Fathers, Heads*, unto the people they are not so to be understood, otherwise then as to the particular persons of men, considered *singly* not *joynly*, what an impudent insolence is it that one that has use of reason, should so wickedly believe the principles of it, to so infinite a consequent of absurdities. For Princes be *Kings, Lords, Fathers, Heads, &c*: to the single person of the Subject only, and not to the universality of them then is every single Subject by himselfe alone a body politique, whereof the King as King, is Head and so hath as many Kingdomes as Subjects: & every one being distinct in relation one from the other, have none nor can have any civil communion among them; neither can any of them have to doe with the civil Affaires one of another. And finally this, (which is not only false but destructive to the publique wealthe)

and safety of all Kingdomes.) If Kings be not Heads of the publique community of their people, as well as of the private particulars of them, then is the publique community out of the Kings Protection and Kings are discharged of all care of the publique. For the mutuality of relation betwixt Protection and Subjection, suffers not the one to move, but within the limits of the other, and if the universality must be under the Kings Protection, it must be also under His Subjection, for which cause the ancient and constant wisdom of our Peers and Commons sitting in *Parliament* as the Body representative of the whole Subject of the Kingdom, doe in the preamble of their Acts, and that quality, to this day, recite themselves His *Majesties loyal and faithfull Subjects*. So that in this point the Observour intently controules the Wisdom and Judgement of the representative of the whole Kingdom, as well as contradicts the principles of Reason.

Lastly, whereas he saith, That Treason so farre as it concerns the Prince, is not so horrid in nature, as oppression in a Prince. Without excusing any way or diminishing the faults of Princes, in any the least act of oppression, let every one but aske his own Conscience, whether is more horrid in Nature, Superiours to wrong Inferiours, or Inferiours their Superiours: Masters their Servants, or Servants their Masters: Husbands their Wives, or Wives their Husbands: Fathers their Children, or Children their Fathers: and he will soon find the impiety of this assertion. And whereas now the Observour professeth his good will and affection to Monarchy. You may by the grounds which he hath laid, and by his propounding to us for a patterne to our Kings, the condition of the Prince of *Orange*, and for our Kingdom, the patterne of the Common-wealth of *Venice*, know how false a meaning he hath, and what his designe is; even to open the lace of Obedience to our Liege Sovereigne, and with it the firme and stedfast stability of the Kingdom, and to prepare mens hearts and persuasions, to the receiving of some new forme of Government, according to the fancy of the common People.

Having therefore with false principles endeavoured to found the original of all Sovereignty in the People, as hoping thereby to find meanes to pluck it out of the Kings hands: he then proceeds to perswade, that not only naturall reason, but even the frame of the

Kingdom, and the positive Laws thereof, doe all concur to maintain the highest Sovereignty to be in the People. But when should make that apparent by the manifest Judgement and Acts of our Law; not being able to doe that, he seeks by sly insinuations, have that admitted and swallowed, which to prove he knows were impossible. Therefore pretending to shew the originall, the progress and changes of Sovereigne Government, all from, and by the authority of the People, even from the fall of *Adam* to the present, when it should be expected he should shew the Sovereignty of the King some to be derived from them, he runnes himselfe into a puzzle, and then breaks off and tells us what he thinks, and he thinks, *That when most Countreies have found out an Art and peaceable order of publique Assemblies, whereby the people may assume its own power, doe it selfe right, without disturbance to it selfe, or injury to Princes; were unjust that would oppose that art and order. That Princes may not be beyond all limits of Law, nor tryed upon them by private parties, the whole community in its underived Majesty, shall convene to Justice, &c.* and so he goes on insinuating, That our Parliaments are such publique Assemblies, wherein the Community in underived Majesty convenes to doe justice upon the King.

Truely I am not so well affected to arbitrary Government, as to admit the Judgement (much lesse the thought of one man) to be a proof of Law and Government. We shall therefore by Gods help examine how well this new conceit agreeth with our Lawes and ancient settled frame of Government. But this is obvious aforesaid, that it is so farre from being true, that most Countreies have found the art and order of *Assemblies* wherein the People may assume the power of doing themselves right. As that unlesse you will call the *Assembly* of some meer popular *Republique*, such an *Assembly* there is not the ordinance of any such *Assembly* to be found in all the world, and the reducing of our Parliaments to such *Assemblies*, will suite as well, as the shaping of our Kingdome to the frame of the Common-wealth of the *Venetians*, or of the *Hollanders*.

That we may know therefore that our Parliaments are no such imaginary Assemblies, in which the People in underived Majesty convene to assume any power supposed to be theirs originally, and with that power to doe themselves right. Even the Observance himselfe hath assured us, when in his fast and loose play, he unawares

confesseth that the composition of our Parliaments are so equall and geometricall, and all parts so orderly contribute their office, as that no part can have any extreme predominance over other. This is most true that he confesseth. God grant that no endeavour to the contrary may ever deprive the Kingdom of the right benefit of this happy and well composed Ordinance. But now then if our Parliaments be ordained *Assemblies*, composed of three necessary different parts, one *Soveraigne*, the other *Subiect*, some appearing for their own interests others representative'y for them that sent them, and all balanced in such a Geometricall equality, as is proper for the conservation of their severall rights and interests from any extreme predominance of one of the parts above the other. Then can they not be assemblies of resumption of the Peoples supposed power, for in such imaginary assemblies, there must be a dissolution of all constitution orders, degrees, and qualities of the parts, and all the Members must be reduced to a naturall equality undistinguished by any difference, of quality, degree or priviledges whatsoever: so as there must be neither King, nor Peers, nor any office or power of the former State remaining, but all resolved into a meere Chaos, till all be new framed by the deity of the people. So farre therefore are our Parliaments from the nature of such Assemblies as that the endeavour of introducing of such Assemblies is most seditious, traiterous, and destructive, not onely to the person and dignity of the King, to the Crown Imperiall and to the Kingdome it selfe (whose well balanced rights have (besides other tyes) been so often, so solemnly, and by so many of us, even by our whole representative body sworn to be defended) but even to the rights, priviledges, and being, of the blessed Ordinance of our Peace and Well-fare of our very Parliaments themselves.

For we must know, That our Law (taking notice, that in every State, there are three parties capable of just or unjust Sovereignty; that is to say, some Prince, the Nobles, and the People) judged no government so safe and assured, as where every of the three parties capable of Sovereignty, were in some sort admitted to a participation of it, but so admitted, as that still the Sovereignty should cleerly remaine to him that ought to be the Soveraigne And to this end, our Law, (having first through the piety of our Law-giving Princes obtained a just & regular course of government; the stability where-

of it found to be more concerned in the power of making Law then in any other power belonging to the Sovereigne) did for preventing innovations that might subvert that settled regularity, such a sort establish the frame of State and Government, as that the Prince should have his hands bound up from using the legislative power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons. It was then, to the end that they (whose consent was brought in onely to prevent the evil which absolute power might work against the settled frame of the State) might not themselves become that evil which they were called to prevent : The Law gave to them more interest in the Legislative power, then it had still left in the hands of the Prince, to wit, to every of the three parties, the King, the Peers and the Commons, an equall power of assent or dissent in the making of new Law. And so by opposing the single power of every one of them to the Votes of every other two; made so secure a balancing of their powers one against another ; as that no practise of any two of them can doe any thing to the prejudice or diminution of the third, without that third party it selfe do give consent unto.

Nor did the providence of the Law rest here. But considering that in the power of making Laws it had now opposed the powers of two numerous bodies, against the power of the single Sovereigne. It foresaw, and feared that by the Soveraignes consenting to Laws for the ease and benefit of the Subject, things might passe to the prejudice and diminution of the Sovereignty, if the single person of the Sovereign (surcharged with the care of the manifold affaires of the Kingdome) should be left all alone to advise and dispute His Right against all the wisdom and sollicitation of the numerous body of the Subject. To prevent that It ordained, that the King should at His own discretion liveare unto Himselfe a body of Councel, to advise Him in the concernments of His Sovereignty, Rights, and safety, (which is His Privy-Councell) and a body of Councell at Law, to advise Him that He may neither doe, nor suffer any thing contrary to the rule of Law. And through this even Counterpoise and baliance of all the three States of *Parliament* (as through a mean) wherewith God hath especially blessed us above other Lands, doe we enjoy the assurance of a regular freedom, under the government of a just and legitimate sovereignty. In which, if without the free concurrence of every of the three ordained parties, there be

have not, both they and His Majesty and both their predecessors ever practised that power? so as we have had scarce one Parliament wherein either King or Peers, or Commons (or perhaps each of them) have not severally dissented from the Votes each of the other two and tye their dissent frustrated the Votes of the other two yet (God be prayed) our Parliaments do, and (we hope) still continue, notwithstanding such *undermining Taxes* would be in threefold Cord of our State, into the single string of a popular assembly, and all things so into confusion?

And how false is the consequence that if the King by dissent may make voyd the sentence of the two Houses of Parliament, he may also voyd the sentence of any inferior Court of Justice? In Parliament, the Law hath appointed the King himselfe His owne Vote and consent, personally if He will, or by His Officers under His great Seale, if He will. But in inferior Courts appointed none to give sentence or Judgement, but only those Judges who in a definite and formall way are ordained to be the Ministers and Deliverers of the Kings Justice and Judgement in his behalfe, so as no personall or instrumentall assent or dissent of the Kings, can alter or frustrate the sentence or Judgement of any inferior Court, because that though the Judges there give the Judgement, and not their own; yet the Law having authorized none but them to be the givers of the Kings Judgement there taketh no notice of any other Judgement in those Courts, therefore of the sworn Judges themselves, and though the King, the Peers, and Commons in Parliament have every one the power, by the casting of one of their Votes to frustrate the Votes of two of them, from commanding the Judgement of the whole Court: yet cannot they of either of the King, the Peers, or Commons alone, or of any two of them, frustrate or change the Judgement of any inferior Court. And it is further to be observed, That in those Courts the Judges as strangers of matters that concerns others only, and not themselves, and therefore render Judgement *in invitum*, against the will of one of the parties at least, in which case because *expedire publica ut finis sit litium*, if all the Judges agree not, yet Judgement shall be given according to the Judgement of the Major part.

But now (contrary to the use of inferior Courts) the Parliament in (those things that concerne the publique) may

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not as meere Judges, but as Parties intereſſed, with things that concerne every of their own Rights, in which caſe it is neither Law nor Reason, that ſome of the Parties ſhould determine of that that concerns all their mutuall intereſts, *in ſua altera parte*, againſt the will of any one of the Parties. But that all parties concur, or eſſe their mutual intereſt to remain in the ſame condition it was before, For parties cannot meddle with judging *in ſua ſua*, but *per conſenſum*, and therefore no major part of the three Parties in Parliament but the conſent of all three muſt make the judgement of that Court, otherwiſe two of the three Parties, may totally or in part oppreſſe the third, and then one of thoſe two, oppreſſe the other, and be a ſole arbitrary Tyrant. The King and Peers may oppreſſe the Commons; the King and Commons may oppreſſe the Peers the Peers and Commons may oppreſſe the King: and then the Peers being eaſily ſuppreſſed by the Commons what ſhall hinder but that ſome *Appian decemvirate* (that under ſhew of zeale of reforming Church and Commonwealth, may carry the ſound and well-aſſected Subject with them) After they ſhall have not onely poſſeſſed mens minds with the lawfulneſſe of their authority, but poſſeſſed themſelves of the *Militia* and all the Power of the Kingdome, and two or three yeares kept all that power in their hands, pretending they cannot ſooner perfect their Lawes of Reformation (though indeed they doe but time it out, till they ſecure all unto their private ends) (as *Appius* in all things did) what then (I ſay) ſhall hinder, but that by meanes of ſome ſuch *decemvirate* among the Commons, ſome *Appius* may invade an abſolute Sovereignty over us, or miſſing that reſolve yet all at our ſetled State, into an unſure troubleſome *Ariſtocracy*? or *Republique*?

The better to prepare the way to ſome ſuch upſhot. The Obſervor finds a defect in the frame of our State, he cannot ſee how *Parliaments* can have ſufficient power, to reſtraine Tyranny, if they can doe no Aſt without the Kings conſent. And he findes, that if *Princes* in matters that concerne the publique, be admitted to preferre weak opinions (as he calls them) before Parliamentary motives, then *Parliaments* are vaine, *Princes* unlimitable, and Subjects miſerable.

The Obſervor will be more wiſe and faithfull then the Law it ſelfe, and looking onely one way, tells us of inſufficient proviſion
for

for restraint of regall power, without some coercive superintend
 be placed over it. But the Law that looks every way, tells us, that
 the erecting of such a superintending power, would unsovereign
 our King, and make that superintending power Sovereigne,
 when it were made, the exercise of it would be subject to m
 dangerous extravagancies then regall power is, and yet lesse cap
 of regulation then it. Therefore the Law (knowing that ther
 none but God, *qui custodiat ipsos custodes*, that can restrain supe
 Governours, and knowing that nothing in the world can be re
 ced to so absolute a perfection of settlednesse, but that in the
 meanes it must necessarily depend upon the providence of God) a
 a full consideration of the weaknesse and imperfection of every
 verall form of Government, concludes, that the sovereignty
 better placed in the hands of a sole Prince, then in a popular or
 thocraticall hand, and that a positive known Law, without any
 cive superintendant, was a sufficient and the best boundaries of
 power, against any irregularity whatsoever, especially when
 Law (being backed with a Parliament of all the orders of the K
 dome) shall thereby find meanes of discovery and manifesta
 both of the truth of the Law it selfe, and likewise of the violati
 it. For the Law, and the transgression of the Law, being bo
 once made manifest and notorious, that will so sufficient a sec
 of the future Observance of the Law, as Princes will not farthe
 dure to violate it; because (as the Poet saies)

*Nec pheros coram populo Medea trucidat,
 Aut humana palam coquit exta nefas in Aethra.*

Infamous acts will not endure to be committed in the sight
 the world.

Therefore to say truth, the Observors concept of having
 superiour power to enforce the Law that should regulate the p
 of the Sovereigne Prince, is a meer false conception of an ne
 traiterous to God as to his Prince, who would have absolute te
 ty by an arme of flesh, when no such can be given to it. For,
 gulate his Prince he would not onely have a Law, but a supe
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have superiour power, over superiour power, *usq; ad infinitum*, and yet at last, leave the most superiour power, in that liberty which the Observour calleth boundlesse, arbitrary and tyrannicall. And how absurd a thing it is to imagine, That when the Law hath trusted the soveraign power in the hands of the King, it should againe distrust Him and unsoveraign Him, and place in another the Sovereignty of the same soveraign Trust? and with a second absurdity leave in the Kings hand the power of calling together and dissolving the power whereby He Himselfe should be constrained? and (to make up all) should by authority of that power, constrain all the Heads of the people, and even the representative body of that power, by solemne oath, to declare that the King is not only *Supreme* Governour, but that He is the *only Supreme* Governour, when (such a superiour power admitted) He can be neither only, nor at all, *Supreme*.

But the Observour aiming more to subvert what is established, then to reduce things unto their first establishment, quarrels still with the Regall power; and he reasons, that whether or no the Law gives the single person of the Prince as full and free a Vote to assent or not assent, is it doth to either the House of Peers or House of Commons, yet is not the Prince to use the liberty of His Vote licentiously, but advisedly and by Councell, and what Councell can He have more wise, faithfull and impartial, then theirs that represent the whole Kingdom, who cannot be supposed to have private ends as Courtiers, Cavaliers, and private men may have?

Truely that Princes ought with great respect to hearken to the advice and information of the great Councell of the body of their people, who can so much as make a question of it? But why should these things be objected to His Majesty? For what Prince of all His Predecessors hath so much harkened & condescended to His great Councell, as His Majesty at once hath done unto this present Parliament? Not any one; Nay, not the whole succession of His predecessors since the granting of the great Charter hath done the like. Witnesse the condescending to the Earle of *Straffords* attainder, the damming of Ship-mony, and of all Monopolies the Star-Chamber, and high Commission Court, the taking away of the Votes of Bishops and of Popish Lords, the parting with the long used power of imposing upon Merchandize bounding of Forreits, and yeelding to the regulation of whatsoever further grievance should be found in the Common-

wealth. And (for a seal of observance of all) the granting of
enniall Parliament, and the perpetuating of this present *Parli*
With what dispensation of the violating of Christianity can
ject (through all these pre umptions to the contrary) charge
veraigne with avertesse to pibique Councell, and in our
private whisper: *So* that being at once posselt of so many no
since unroped or satisfactions, we might not want hearts to
them and acknowledge them.

But the two Houses thought the King some in imminent
and desire it should be put in a posture of defence, and His M
by evil Councell refused and deferred them. Truly the Ob
neither doth nor can shew, That His Majesty, upon the Parli
apprehension of danger, refused to take order for the defence
King him, for the contrary thereof is true. And in His seeking
cure it by a military posture, He so farre condescended to th
faction of His Parliament, as that He offered to change the p
that in any County had the charge of the *Militia* if His Parli
made any just exception to any of them. And for His *Majesty*
ming to the Parliament to *Westminster*, even in that also He
hearkned to them, as that he offered, that if, to secure future les
they would make some exemplar punishment of the Actors
late *seditions tumults here*, He would even come thither. Al
ing refused in that, He notwithstanding, offered them to co
any other indifferent place. As for the place where they n
who (that hath vowed His Faith to the Laws of the Land,
the Priviledge of *Parliament*) can in such Conscience as He w
siver God withall, hold that a place of indifference and of fr
to Vote in, where the people in *Tumult* demanded of the Ho
Commons to know who were the Lords that refused to Vote
them, and where some of the *Peers* were assaured by the mul
for having differed in their Votes from them, and yet none of
Tumults were punished or ever questioned from it.

But ere we leave this point of hearkening to the advice of
ment, we must consider too, that though we grant it behoove
the King to hearken to His Parliament, we must not underst
so behoove it, as that there should be inevitable necessity laic
Him, that He must follow whatsoever they advise, for then
blow we overthrow the fundamental Law and frame of Parlian

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If from any of the three formall parts of the Parliament we take away the freedom of Voting to assent or dissent, we breake the threefold cord of the State, we cast away the ballance of it, and even dissolve the very frame it selfe. If when for necessity of State, the Head assembles the whole body in Councell. (where the Law gives the Head one Vote of three, and allowes Him a Body of Privy-Councell to maintain the proper Rights of the Head, the Head may not use that power which the Law giveth it, no not in case the two other parts contest and claime part of the Right belonging to the Head, and where (by Law) the Vote of the Head is opposed in ballance, to the moderation of those two powers; as well as their powers are opposed in ballance to the power of the Head; but that the Head must do all things according to the advice and counsel of the two parts, which are the body of the Subject. Then all that solemne forme of Law, that calleth the Head, Sovereign: that authorized the Head to swear a body of Privy Councell; to convoke the Nobles and Commons in publique Councell; to call to that Councell whom He thinketh good: to take homage of the Peers, and Oath of Supremacy of the Commons: and having used their Councell, at His Judgement to dissolve it. All this (I say) is then a meer misleading formality of the Law. The Sovereignty (against all our Oathes and expressions to the contrary) is not in the King but in the people; the King is the on y Subject, and but a common vouchee, whose concurrence is unavoidably involved; His will, His understanding, and His power (though He be acknowledged Head, Sovereign, and chief residence of authority) is all subjected to the body of the very Subject that in the Parliament doth swear subjection to Him. The tripartite frame of a *Parliament* of three estates, is a vanishing apparition: there is really nothing but a meer popular assembly, not of Subjects but Sovereignes. The Crowne Imperiall and kingdom it selfe, (though asserted by our solemnest Acts of Recognition and oathes of the body representative) are meer *non entia*, we are but a Republique, and the chief Head of the Kingdom hath not (beside the name) more of a King, then the Duke of *Vence*, or the Prince of *Orange*. And this being hid ever since the first beginning of the Kingdome; the whole generation of the Subject ever since, hata by the injury of our Laws, been most impiously mis-worne in their Allegiance; and the error hath never been discovered till the

whole Kingdome (having now solemnly sworn to stand to, and defend the Lawes) cannot recede from their wrong-sworn obedience but with the guilt of universall perjury, and under the burden of that guilt, expose an old grown Kingdome, to the hazard of a framed Common-wealth. All this does necessarily follow, take away the freedome of the Kings assent and dissent in *ment*, or barre Him of the use of His Countells advice there.

I should little need to say any thing concerning that which Observour so much pretends that Communities, and universall of men, are void of corrupt affections and of private ends: and therefore their desires are alwayes just, and their Connezell free and impartiall. But when in the fallacy of this persuasion lyes (I feare) a great part of the sinne, for which Gods anger publicly doth shew it selfe upon us, I would be loath to touch without any touch at all. I feare we are too diffident upon the ordinance of God: I feare we are too confident of ourselves, as if our owne naturall providence (if we were left) were beyond any other means of safety, although it were the ordinance of God unto us. A word or two shall not therefore be necessary concerning the corruptions and errors, that even communities themselves are often subiect to.

That Communities are lesse subject to private ends and affections, than particular men are, is true: but it is also true, that they are not absolutely free from them, and when they fall into them, they are more fatally violent and dangerous. And though one would think it repugnant, that an universality (which contains the whole lique) should have private ends; or that that should any way beget private, which they that containe the publique doe pursue: seeing it is not the number of agents, but the capacity in which they act, the quantity of their acting, and the coherence or incoherence of what they pursue, with the publique end and weale; that the actions of men publique or private: it must needs follow, without authority, or out of the way of the publique ordinance, pursue any thing (though the whole community concur in the pursuit) yet is all of the nature of a private action done to a particular private end, for though the thing intended be to the good of the publique, yet being beside the ordinance and way of consequence against the good and weale of the publique, & to

the very ends of the publique. And as in the body naturall a very few members (that is, none but the eyes) have the sense of seeing; but all the members have the sense of feeling; so in Communities, all have the sense of enjoying good or suffering evil; but very few the facultie of discerning the cause in means of either. Yet the major part of the Community (more carried by sense then true discerning) oft makes the judgement of the whole Community, and brings it to act that, that agreeth not with the intended weale of the Community. By this means (at the best) the whole universality of the *Israelites* (contrary to their own small good & prosperity) forced their Priests to set them up Golden Calves. By this means the universality of them again revolved from *David* (their King by Gods immediate O dination) to *Absolom* an usurper. By this means the universality of the tenne Tribes, for redresse of their grievances, rebelled against *Dauids* Grand-child, and set up *Je.oboam*, who reviving their own affected false Religion, authorised that sinne which purified them in their extirpation. It is therefore an untruth, to say that Communities can have no private ends, and a belying of the Law and Truth to say (as *fol. 22.*) that ever there was such a *Maxime*.

But it will be said, that though in Communities the body at large (in which the vulgar is the greatest part) may be subject to corrupt affections and ends; yet the body representative, which is the Choice of the Community, is to be presumed free from corrupt ends and affections, and therefore most wise, faithfull, and assured.

Truely we pray, That since in this knot lye many scruples that wring the Consciences of thousands in our *Israel*, we may with modest freedom, reason the things that tend to clearing the Honor and obervance due to representatives. To whom we acknowledge the highest honour and obervance that can be given to the body represented. But the honour and authority of the representative will alwayes depend upon two things, that is, the quality and condition of the body represented, and the quality of the representation it selfe: for as that is more or lesse proper and lively, so will it derive more or lesse authority and reputation. If therefore the body at large be an absolute free Sovereign (as is the Community of a right Republicke), the true representative of that body is then to be observed with all sovereign honour and due subjection: but if the body

at large be it selfe a Subject, the honour and authority of the representative cannot exceed the honour and authority of a Subject: none can make their image more then they themselves are. then, (besides that all representations how plenariy soever authorized, must ever be subject to the condition of the body represented) The repute and authority of representatives, will also follow the soundnesse or weaknesse, exactnesse or imperfection of the representation it selfe. For if throughout an whole Community representers be equally and proportionably ordained according to the true relative interest, that each part which sendeth them to the whole publique (as in the United Provinces they are) will be all full acknowledgment of authority to the representative, that possibly can be to the body at large: and there will arise some presumption that the representatives are authorized, to determine soveraignly of those things that concerne the publique, if (on the other sides) there be no equality, in making representatives observed: but that some parts send as many as others that are a hundred times greater and more considerable, both in power and port of burthen in the Common-wealth, and if for some of the none are admitted to choose the representers, but substantiall Freeholders, and for other parts all are admitted of what condition soever. And if the number of those that are unproportionably promiscuously chosen, do three or foure fold, exceed the number of them that are strictly chosen for the most principal part of the Community. And lastly, if it lye in the power of some other authority to give to some particular Towns the power of sending representatives, equall in number to the greatest Provinces or the Community. These circumstances will not onely detract from the repute and authority that a more exact representative of the Community may have, but vehemently demonstrate that the institution and end of such a representative is rather to minister information of the state and condition of every of those particular places and advice, assistance to some other Sovereigne, and to consent with Him, than to determine soveraignly it selfe.

To come then to the Objection of the assurednesse of Representatives in their judgement and fidelity. If in Kingdoms, we be a representative body of the Community meane a perfect representation of the whole body Politique, so as that the Head as we

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the other parts doe freely cooperate and concurre (as in our Acts of Parliamen it ever doth) then can we presume no other Counsaile more wisely, wisely, faithful, or safe for the publique, then is the counsaile of the universall representative in that sense. But if by the representative, we mean the representation of the grosse of the body without the Head, (that is, the representative of the body of the Subject only, then is the assertion false, for the Law preumes not in the representative of the Subject, so assured judgement and fidelity for government as it doth in the Sovereign head alone, for then it would not have placed the Sovereignty in the Head, but in the representative of the grosse of the body. But the Law knowing both Communities themselves, subject to dangerous incinations from private incitements, and their representatives likewise subject to misleadings, factions, and ambitions of private men, hath (as in the most assured place, placed the Sovereignty in the Head, and the Head so having the ordinance, both for judgement and for Government, where the ordinance is, there is the blessing and there the best assurance.

We need not seek examples how representative bodies of Subjects moving without consent of their Head have been misled: there is not one imitable example to be found that ever the representative of the Subject, moved to act Sovereignly without the consent of the Head. But we have examples of Sovereigne representatives, in Republics themselves, notoriously misled by private men; was there ever a more reverent representative then the Roman Senate, yet did not *Appian* and his faction, under the colour of a *Decemvirate* (or Committee of Reformation) so blind that Senate, as to work them to conferre all the power of the Common-wealth into his and his Factions hands, to the subversion of the common liberty? so as that if by accident he had not been taken away, he had made himselfe Prince? And was not that Sovereigne representative, another time wholly swayed and carried by *Marius* and *Sulpitius*? Sure as nothing is more wholesome for the Publique, then that the Sovereigne of a Kingdom should often have the advice of the body representative of the Community, so is it most dangerous for the publique to have the advice of the Community enforced on the Sovereigne, least so that that should be for Our good, be unto us an occasion of falling.

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But the Observour insists not so much, that the representative body is the great Councell of the King and Kingdom : as that it is the supreme judge and the most soveraign power. If the Prince (he) be seduced, some Court must judge of the seducement, and some power enforce that judgement, and that must be the Parliament (meaning the two Houses of Parliament.)

We have already shewed the absurdity of a superiour power to enforce the Sovereign : but farther to dissolve all difficulties, and false assertion, we must know that in Parliament there are two kinds of judgements. And that the meer representative body is, the house of Commons solely, hath not any judicatory power in it selfe, unlesse it be in particular cases concerning their own officers and members. But they are as the great inquest of the King, to enquire, discover, impeach, &c. The house of Peeres hath power only in all things judgement preparatory in order to judgement in Parliament, as to give Oath, to take recognizance, to fine, to imprison, &c. In matters that come before them by writ of Error, judgement *decisive* to determine and adjudge Law. But this judgement it hath not as it is part of the representative body : for the representative body hath not therein any part with it. But the house of Peeres alone hath this superiour judgement, as great Court of Kings Barons of the Kingdom, which being assisted with the Judges of all the Benches, is by formall Ordinance of Law in all matters coming before it the proper and immediat superiour Judge. But it is not absolute supreme Judge of Law in all things; and therefore it cannot revoke the judgement which it selfe hath given, neither can the House of Commons, nor the two Houses together revoke, or annul any judgement given in the House of Peeres, nor where; therefore also the two Houses are not supreme judges or declarers of Law. The *Observer* (fol. 44.) tells you the reason, that the supreme judge or declarer of Law is all one as to be supreme Judge of Law, and that you know the two Houses are not. But the whole three Estates of *Parliament*, that is, in the King, the Lords, and Commons, there, and there only are all powers ingredient, they upon Bill are not only Judges of the last resort, to reverse the judgement of the House of Peeres and of inferiour Courts, but they can repeale and restore, and repeale againe *in infinitum* their judgements and Acts. And they can not onely deciare the Law

they can make the Law and none but they. They alone are they that cannot be bound by precedents or Acts of Parliament, they alone are they that have the Legislative Power : and therefore they, and only they that have the absolute Supreme Judgement of the Law.

But (saith the Ob'server) *The King deserts his Parliament*, implying that then the two houses must be supreme Judges; though otherwise they were not. As well may he imply, That if the King come not to Parliament, then are the two Houses no more Subjects, but *Soveraignes*, yea Soveraignes in the highest exaltation. Let us see what this deserting is, that shall so easily create Soveraignty in Subjects. We know that by the Law, the Kings personal presence is of no absolute necessity to the proceedings of Parliament, and that by the Law (declared and confirmed 33. Hen. 8. 21.) the Kings presence is not necessary at His giving consents to Acts passed, but He may give consent in His absence by His great Seale. If then the Law count His personal absence no deserting : and as to deserting for want of just and reasonable consent to their demands, His Majesty be so little faulty toward this Parliament, as that He hath given His Consent beyond the example of His Predecessors. Where then shall a sincere Conscience in any deserting the King hath made, find warrant enough to desert his Soveraigne, and acknowledge another Superior ? But to return.

Diversity of Powers and authorities exercised in the severall parts of Parliament, necessarily causes a diversity of respect and observance to be rendred to them. And though the judgement of the representative of the Subject (that is, of the Peers and Commons, in those things wherein it is properly exercised ought to have esteem and credit before any other judgement of the Subject. Yet is it not to be opposed to the judgement of the Soveraign, in those things which the law hath entrusted to the judgement of the Soveraign for the law trusteth none, but whom it judgeth to have judgement, fidelity and provision of all necessary incidents sufficient for that trust, and then it prefers both the Acts and judgement, of the party trusted, before any other judgement whatsoever. Nor is the judgement of the whole Kingdome any whit slighted thereby, no more then if in particular Sciences (as Divinity, Philosophy, Physick, Mathematicke, &c.) the judgement of the professors of those Sciences should be preferred before the judgement of the whole body representative, for Uni-

enig, in sua arte credendum. Matters of State and secrets of government are not only unfit and dangerous to be publickly managed by so numerous a body as our representative is. but the greater part so little experienced or able to mannage them, as that in Edward the third's time, the House of Commons themselves (as the Oblivion (fol. 6. tell us) desired they might be spared from giving advice in those matters, *de queux ils n'ont pas cognizance*, of which they were not the Cognitans. The Judgement of the body representative, did not at that time beleive, but that as well the Judgement of the King, the care of the *Ardua Regni*, did chiefly belong to the King, to whom alone, the Law having committed the Sovereign Government, ordained him withall, a body of sworn privie Counsellors to advise him in all the Rights and Priviledges, that belongs unto Him as Supreme Head, and first of the three States of Parliament.

If any of the sworn Counsaillers shall Counsaile the King against the known Law, or any by their Counsaile, do any thing against the Law after legall proceeding and conviction, it will soon be out of the King's power on what shall become of them. But if without legall proof or conviction, such Counsaillers shall by generall Vote of the Subject be censured private whisperers & seducers of the King, and to be publicly removed from Him: then shall the King at once be dangerously deprived of the constant means which the Law hath especially ordained Him, for support of His Right against the other two seducing powers, and for the good discharge of His Kingly office. If any men shall so be condemned and made guilty, more by the partiality and uncountroulableness of Judgement ascribed to the Counsaillers, then by cleareness of evidence and legall proof of any crime, then is the birthright of the Subject, in the highest concernment of his Life and fortunes taken from Him, and He must stand and fall by the Vote of the People, that (like a Judgement infallible) shall be the office of both witnesses, Peers and Judge.

While I pursue the examination of those things which the King's servour would have received for reason, I may not yet slip the consideration of his slye unfaithfulness and deceit, to passe over that which most of all concerns the soules and bodies, lives and fortunes of the whole Kingdome, and all because his want of prudence at that point, does (if noted) overthrow all that he contends for.

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though he argues the lawfulness of Subjects taking up Armes and re-
sisting the Authority and Commands of the King, under the warrant
of a general rule to this effect, *That in extreame perill and faillance of
ordinary meanes, any extraordinary meanes may be taken for the safety
of the People*: yet finding an impossibility of proving the State in
such extreame danger (for in leed such a danger must be so with e to
all men as not to need any proving) and finding it also not possible
to prove a necessity of the Subjects arming himselfe for want of
other meanes, when His *Majesty*, (in whom the naturall ordinary
meanes of protection is placed) readily offered, and yet offers, to
performe that regall office of protecting; The Observour passes over
the matter without proving either danger or want of other meanes,
and presses only the lawfulness of selfe-defence in extreame danger,
as if (if that were granted) ail men might take up Armes whether
there were danger or no and whether there were other ordinary
meanes of defence or no, and so securely doe we pursue this error,
as that we with it swallow any thing, and because that in ordinary
Providing for danger before it threaten, the ordinary courses of par-
ting the Kingdom in a posture of defence by Commissions of Lieve-
tenancy and of Array, are voted illegall, therefore we not only ad-
mit them to be so, but we admit also that the King (to whom it Pro-
perly belongs to take order for the safety of the Kingdome) may not
in extremitie of danger, by any meanes that he can use, raise Arms,
and put the Kingdome in a posture of defence, but the Subject (to
whom it is Treason (by the Law) to raise Forces without autho-
rity from the King) he may (against the ordinary rule of Law) raise
Armes in the very same forme that is unlawfull for the King to doe,
and all because of the extreame necessity and danger. Yet the very
same necessity and danger shall not make it lawfull to the Right and
proper Authority of the King to doe the very same thing. Oh,
What shall we say, when at once, extreame necessity is pretended,
all wonted formes of defence (without shewing a lawfull forme)
are declared unlawfull, and the course which Law abhorres, and the
Conscience of every Law-sworne Christian trembles at, is set on
foot, without the warrant of the lawfull Sovereign, when yet he is
ready to supply that office in the Just and lawfull way?

I cannot also but note, that though levying of Armes and put-
ting the Kingdome in a posture of defence is a right so clearly belong-

ing to the King, as that we know His *Majesty* & all His *Pre*
have ever been possessed of it as a right and authority int
annexed to the Crown, which never any have lawfully exerc
they. And though the representative body of the kingdome,
them) every one of the body represented have, according to
tive Law, sworn allegiance to the King, and sworne to assis
send &c. all *priviledges, preheminences, and authorities belongin*
highnes, His heirs and successors, or annexed to the Imperia (*rc*)
Realm, &c. Yet is not the Observer afraid to say, that the Oat
premacie is not endangered by such taking of Arms. Nor is h
to say, that next to renouncing of God, nothing under Heav
more perfidious, then peoples withdrawing themselves from
representations. As if Subjects, by giving authority to some
fellows to represent them, and to advise, and consent for the
them a power so much above the condition of Subjects, yea,
above the condition of their Sovereigne, as that neither b
Faith, nor Oath, nor any other duty unto him, were compar
their withdrawing from the Vote or Act of their own repres
as if the right of the King, the Crown and Kingdom; and th
currence of the three Estates in Parliament, did not so con
Commons of the Land, but that (against all) they stood soly
in allegiance to their representers, as to the only Sovereignes
obedience. O that it may please the two honourable Houses
into a serious consideration, how repugnant these position
the loyalty of a true Christian: how hard it is for a pious Con
to perswade it selfe that they that broach such Doctrines, int
thing but the defence of the King, of the Laws of the Land
the true Protestant Religion: how much the Name and Ma
God him selfe is blasphemed, when in a Christian Kingdome
boasts it selfe of the knowledge and true profession of his
such Doctrines so derogatory to Christianity, should so auda
be maintained. And lastly, how much it must needs reflect
their own honour, in point of jealousie and distrust (as if
affected factious persons had too great an influence and pow
their Votes) when such impious assertions so desperately mis
the soules and Consciences of men, are so licentiouslly divulge
out any condemnation, check, or discountenances from them,
earnestly desired by His *Majesty* at their hands.

I suppose there remains not in the observations any thing materiall, that is not already answered. As for the designe of changing Religion into Popery, which the Observer perhaps glances at in speaking of *Popish Prelaticall and Military Corruptions*. If a Christian can in his Conscience finde any other ground for such beleife, then only the opinion of a judgement, that would be beleived rather for authorities sake, then for any thing proved or discovered, he then may well listen to it. But if in stead of presumptions that way, he findes presumptions of intended change to the contrary Corruption of Religion, a good Conscience will not be so Popishly affected; as for the infallibility of any judgement, to beleive contrary to what his heart telleth him the most apparent presumption must incline him. For besides that it is easier to bring in a corruption in extremity contrary to an old exploded corruption, then to recover that, that hath been once exploded, (as Popery hath been and is.) We have His *Majesties* often solemn attestation of God, imprecating the prosperity of Him and His, if he do not maintain the true Protestant Religion established in the Church of England against all Popery. We have not the like on the other part, against Schismaticall Innovations. Yet our Schismaticques are thrice so many as our Papists; and whereas our Papists are (God be thanked) disarmed, awed, and in feare, our Schismaticques are bold, armed, and in authority, and therefore licentious and tumulting in every pace.

God will require an account of our Oathes, and Protestations, for defence of the true Protestant Religion, as well against Schismaticall corruptions, as against Popish. And an account of our solemn Oathes of Supremacy, and of observance of the Law as well against popular intolences, and invasions of Sovereigne power as against regall Tyranny. Let us take heed, that when *because of Oathes the Land* already *mournes*; we through an universall breach of Oathes make it not for perjury mourne more grievously. Least when with our solemn Oathes, we have brought the animadversion of our observance of Law, of Right, and of Religion, before the presence of God, as Judge and Revenger of it; and with our own hands kindled a Fire for the triall of it: we our selves be found guilty of a breach, or of halting in it. Let us weigh well the cause, the ground, the way, and the end of our taking Armes, that the honour of unjust and carnall blood-shedding may not lye upon us; let us see what

it is that we wou'd have, which we may not already have out it.

May we not after some provision made for forbearance of Ceremonies, as by the Judgement of the Church shall be known to be spared, have the authorized service of the Church established? And after purgation and regulation of some enormities in the government, have the discipline of the Church of England in that condition settled with severe penall provision against contrivance of Innovators in the one or in the other? Hath not His Majesty declared himselfe ready and willing to consent thereto? Againe may we not make sure the abolishing of all grievances already suppressed, regulate Arms, and some other extravagances in government yet provided for, may we not have fit provisionary Laws, whereof severe and penall damning of all practices to the contrary? May His Majesty to that also freely offer His consent? what can be wanting to the setting of as sound and well a governed Church as any Nation under Heaven hath ever lived in? For if by Law the persons of them that shall attempt any thing prejudiciall to the settled practice of Religion or to the declared liberty of the subject be exposed to exemplary punishment, no feare of Innovation or the prejudice of either can remaine. Nor can we feare His Majesty tolerating of offenders when besides his imprecating curse upon himselfe and His, He has (in case He so violates the Law) His owne mouth dispenced with His Subjects obedience. Our *Parliaments*, it can no way be in the power of the King to take away the least Right, much lesse the being of *Parliaments*; for whatsoever a King can do to the prejudice of *Parliaments*, and ever averle He may be from them, yet alwayes the necessity of the State will at last enforce the calling of a *Parliament*, and when called, it is presently repossessed, and re-invested of all the ancient and Priviledges that doe belong unto it. For nothing but a new *Parliament* it selfe, or so much of a *Parliament*, as in the peoples hands shall have the authority of the whole *Parliament*, can any way take away the being of *Parliaments*, or deprive them of the least right or priviledge belonging to them.

To conclude theretore, if they that devised and broached these State principles and doctrines published in the book of *Objections* have in them dealt truly and faithfully with the Subject.

the Author of those Doctrines rejoyce in them that receive and maintain them ; and let the maintainers of them rejoyce in them that were the Authors. But if they have dealt unfaithfully and deceptually with the Soules of the Subject to cause the blinde (that cannot Judge) to erre, thereby to bring to passe their own designed innovations. Then let it please the Just, and All-seeing Supreme Judge of Judges in mercy to so many thousand Soules in this our *Israel*, who in the darknesse of these difficulties know not the right hand from the left, to send (as once he did at *Jorhams* instance) *Jud. 9.* 16. a fire from the malicious Authors of them, to bring to confusion and shame the malignant maintainers and defenders of them ; and a fire from them to bring to confusion the malicious Authors. And let the Throne of Our Sovereigne Lord the King, (with us the only supreme Vicegerent of the Great and Supreme Judge) be in Righteousnesse, in Judgement, in True Religion, and in Peace for ever established over us.

F I N I S.
